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MENTAL CRUELTY AS A GROUND
FOR DIVORCE
T HERE HAS ALWAYS BEEN a reluctance on the part of the
courts to interfere with family life.1 Marriage, since earliest times,
has been linked with religious dogma and standards of behaviori 2 con-
sequently, it is not unusual to find that as the English judicial system
developed, the duties of marital counsel as well as adjudication were
exercised by the ecclesiastical courts3 and by the legislature; 4 nor is it
startling that there was great reluctance on the part of the bishop in the
ecclesiastical court to extend the scope of authority by which the laity
could sever the bonds "which Heaven hath made."5  This dose re-
lationship between spiritual concepts and the marital status has provided
a most formidable barrier to the development of effective divorce law.
Since there were no ecclestiastical courts included in the American
judicial structure, and because equity courts declined jurisdiction over
divorce matters in the absence of special statutory authority," the legis-
latures of the several states assumed supervision over the granting of
divorce decrees.7 Thus, in the early history of the United States, legis-
lative grant was the sole practicable means by which an effective divorce
decree might be obtained, and petition to the legislature for divorce was
common practice. As the demand for divorces became more prevalent,
the burden of this practice became more onerous until, finally, the legis-
latures delegated divorce administration to the courts.' The aim of
these delegating statutes was to open the door to an easier solution for
a most delicate problem; the result has been a confused and incongruous
body of law.
Much of the confusion in divorce law stems from the inability of
judges to alleviate pressing marital problems in the face of restrictive
statutes. So well defined are the statutory grounds for divorce that
'See HOWARD, A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS 3-117 (.904).
2 See generally KITCHEN, A HISTORY OF DIVORCE (1gz).
2 BL. COMM. 440.
POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENG. LAW (zd Ed. 1898) P. 385.
That "marriages are made in heaven" was long the prevailing philosophy of the
English ecclesiastical courts. See POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, note 4. supra, c. I for a de-
tailed appraisal of the position of the ecclesiastical courts in marital matters.
'See Burtis v. Burtis, 14 Am. Dec. 563 (N.Y. Ch. i8z5).
"JACOBS AND GOEBEL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS 379 ( 3 d
ed. 1952).
Bi,. at 38o. Divorce by legislative grant is not entirely extinct3 but it is so im-
practicable as to be rarely attempted.
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courts have been compelled to concoct, by loose interpretation of exist-
ing statutory requirements, grounds for divorce which were not within
the contemplation of the drafters of the divorce statutes. The judicially
created ground most frequently relied upon is that of mental cruelty.
Under the early statutes physical injury, actual or menaced, .was a
requisite for divorce on the grounds of cruelty." Not until i872 was
there any judicial recognition that injury, other than actual physical
injury, might be so unbearable as to warrant court dissolution of the
marital relationship.10 However, once "mental cruelty" was introduced
as a ground for divorce, many courts were not loath to accept it as a
make-shift panacea for legislative conservatism;" and, finally, state
legislatures have begun to accept the doctrine of mental cruelty.
12
Since divorce statutes and judicial interpretations thereof differ from
state to state, it is impossible to formulate an all-inclusive definition of
mental cruelty sufficient to warrant divorce. The best that can be done,
perhaps, is to examine the various types of relevant statutory provisions
and the manner in which they have been applied in various fact situa-
tions.
THE STATUTES
Divorce law is characterized by an amazing lack of statutory
uniformity with regard to cruelty as a ground for divorce. Demonstra-
tive of this lack of uniformity is such non-definitive statutory phraseology
as: "extreme cruelty,"' 3 "cruel and inhuman treatment,' n 4 "extreme
'Evans v. Evans, x Hag. Cons. 35, x6x Eng. Rep. 466, 467 (1790) wherein Lord
Stowell stated: "What merely wounds the feelings is in few cases to be admitted, where
not accompanied by bodily injury, either actual or menaced. Mere austerity of temper,
petulence of manner, rudeness of language, a want of civil attention and accommoda-
tion, even occasional sallies of passion, if they do not threaten bodily harm, do not
amount to legal cruelty; they are high moral offenses in the marriage state, undoubtedly,
not innocent in any state of life; but they are not that cruelty against which the law
can relieve. Under such misconduct of either of the parties, for it may exist on one
side as well as the other, the suffering party must bear in some degree the consequences
of an unjudicious connection5 must subdue by decent resistant or by prudent concilia-
tion5 and if this cannot be done, both must suffer in silence."
1 Birch v. Birch, i Rob. Ecc. 675, 163 Eng. Rep. 1175 (187z).
" In 1932, 42.7 percent of all divorces in the United States were granted on
grounds of cruelty. 1932 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS REPORT. In recent years, courts
in jurisdictions which offer no statutory opening for granting divorces on grounds of
mental cruelty have been stretching the statutory language in order to make room for
such a ground. See note, 19 ORE. L. REV. 34.1 (939).
"See appendix infra.
"In statutes of 17 jurisdictions: California, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Okla-
homa, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota. See Appendix infra.
" In statutes of six jurisdictions: Alaska, Indiana, Minnesota, New Mexico, Texas,
Wisconsin. See Appendix infra.
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cruelty . .. as to render cohabitation unsafe,' 5 "habitual cruel and
inhuman treatment,' 6 "extreme and repeated cruelty,"'1 "cruelty of
treatment,"'" and "intolerable cruelty."' 9  It is well to note that many
of these statutory "definitions" make no distinction between physical
cruelty and mental cruelty-leaving to the courts the task of deciding
whether mental cruelty alone is sufficient under the statutory lan-
guage. In fact, in only nine states do statutes make specific reference
to mental cruelty as a ground for divorce.20  Statutes in ten other juris-
dictions, however, provide for divorce in cases of "personal indignities
rendering life burdensome," a peg upon which situations amounting in
other states to mental cruelty may conveniently be hung.2' And ju-
dicial construction placed upon "indignities" is generally so similar to
that placed on mental cruelty that it will not be treated separately.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
The modern definition of "mental cruelty" has evolved from two
distinct judicial techniques. On the one hand, the courts have character-
ized as necessary ingredients of "mental cruelty" various factors which
are commonly present in situations of marital discord. On the other
hand, they have approached the problem by defining "mental cruelty"
not so much in terms of component factors, but rather by determining
whether a certain course of conduct is so anti-social or so out of harmony
with our traditions of marriage that it warrants a divorce decree.
FACTORS CONSIDERED IMPORTANT
Necessity for Resudting Physical Injury and/or Injury to the Health of
Complainant.
A review of the cases reveals that in some states, as indicated by
the Appendix, cruelty is tantamount to physical cruelty. In a second
group22 mental cruelty is recognized, but only where it has impaired the
complainant's health. 3 In a third group, the courts have construed
cruelty to include both physical and mental attacks upon the innocent
spouse. 4
1" Delaware. See Appendix infra. 18 Mississippi. See Appendix infra.
17 Illinois. See Appendix infra. 18 Maryland. See Appendix infra.
" Connecticut. See Appendix infra.
2' Statutes in California, Colorado, Montana, South Dakota, and Utah refer spe-
cifically to "mental cruelty," while the Arizona, Michigan, Nebraska, and Wisconsin
statutes are here included because they refer to cruelty, whether by use of personal
violence "or by other neans" (emphasis added). See Appendix infra.
2'Alaska, Arkansas, Hawaii, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
Washington, Wyoming. See Appendix infra.
-- See cases cited in note 31 infra.
The "injury to health" requirement was first expressed by Lord Stowell in Evans
v. Evans, i Hag. Cons. 35, 161 Eng. Rep. 4.66 (1790), note 9 supra.
", The California court, for example, had previously allowed itself to be confined
1954]
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The more liberal view was expressed by the Oklahoma court in
Routh v. Roath, 5 where a husband was granted a divorce, despite no
showing of physical injury, on the grounds that his wife engaged in
annoying and accusatory conversations with husband's friends and
threatened to kill complainant. The court wrestled with the factor of
physical injury and concluded that it was unnecessary to give cause for
divorce. Similarly, in Georgia "cruel treatment" has been construed to
mean the infliction of either physical or mental pain without the re-
quirement of actual physical injury,20 and, in a like manner, the courts
of Florida,2 7 Indiana,2 8 Iowa,20 and Kentucky"0 have dispensed with
the necessity for acts resulting in physical injury. Thus, the modern
trend seems to lead away from physical injury requisites.
A further requisite, perhaps more prevalent than that of physical
injury, is that the health of the complaining spouse be adversely affected
by the acts of the other. The most frequently announced view is that
there must have been injury to the complainant's health, or that such
injury is imminent if the acts complained of are continued,8 1 or that
there is a reasonable apprehension on the part of complainant that in-
by historical demands for cruel acts evidenced by physical injury. Waldron v. Waldron,
85 Cal. z51, 24 Pac. 649 (i89o). The Waldron case was later determined to be overly
confining in Barnes v. Barnes, 95 Cal. 171, 30 Pac. 298 (189z). See also Fleming
v. Fleming, 95 Cal. 430, 30 Pac. 566 (1892 ) ; Cooper v. Cooper, 17 Mich. 204 (1868).
California has recently overruled its previous limitations, and now holds that mental
suffering alone may constitute extreme suffering within the meaning of the California
statute. McFall v. McFall, 588 Cal. App.zd zoS, 136 P.zd 58o (1943).
"Routh v. Routh, i9 Okla. 419, i3o P.zd xooo (1942).
"1 Holcombe v. Holcombe, 197 Ga. 1o5, 27 S.E.2d 687 (93).
"Baldwin v. Baldwin, 151 Fla. 314, 9 So.zd 717 (19+2).
Mendenhall v. Mendenhall, i16 Ind. App. 545, 64 N.E.zd 8o6 (1946).
.Dillavou v. Dillavou, 235 Iowa 634, 17 N.W.zd 393 0945).
"°Ezell v. Ezell, 76o Ky. 775, 776, 86 S.W.zd 998, 999 (1935) wherein the
court stated, "The constant ding dong of the charge he [defeizdant, husband] made,
day in and day out, month in and month out, year in and year out and compelling her
[complainant, wife] to live under constant espionage, were enough to drive her mad
and the court did not err in granting her a divorce."
"Waltenberg v. Waltenberg, 298 Fed. 84z (D.C. Cir. 1924), Carr v. Carr, 171
Ala. 600, 55 So. 96 (191) ; Crum v. Crum, 57 Cal. App. 539, 207 Pac. 5o6 (1922)5
Baker v. Baker, 9. Fla. 1001, 114 So. 66i (1927); Thompson v. Thompson, 186 Iowa
xo66, 173 N.W. 55 (1919) 5 Johnson v. Johnson, 183 Ky. 421, 209 S.W. 385 (.919);
Krauss v. Krauss, 163 La. 2 1, iii So. 683 (1927); McCue v. McCue, 191 Mich. x,
157 N.W. 369 (i916); Faris v. Faris, 107 Neb. 214, 185 N.W. 347 (92;)
McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 48 Nev. 153, 238 Pac. 402 (1925), Pearson v. Pearson,
23o N.Y. 141, 129 N.E. 349 (ig±o) 5 Robertson v. Robertson, 73 Okla. 299, 176 Pac.
387 (1918); Heinemann v. Heinemann, 118 Ore. 178, 245 Pac. io8z (x9z6), Borda
v. Borda, 44 R.I. 337, 117 Atl. 362, (19ZZ); Burt v. Burt, 261 S.W. 407 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1924) 5 Elder v. Elder, 139 Va. 19, 123 S.E. 369 (9z4), White v. White, 1o6
W. Va. 68o, 146 S.E. 720 (.929).
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jury to health will result." These "injury to health" requirements,
while appearing less onerous than other necessary factors at first glance,
would be rendered even more formidable were it not for the fact that
the courts require little proof of injury to health33 or assume such in-
jury without proof."1 Thus, while Connecticut requires a complainant
to show, by a preponderance of evidence, injury to health,"3 the courts
of Massachusetts, Michigan,3 7 Minnesota,," and Rhode Island"9 pay but
lip service to this requirement, being easily persuaded that such injury
has occurred or will result.
Necessity for Malicious Intent.
Some courts hold that malice is an essential element of mental
cruelty which the divorce-seeking party must establish. The presence
of some degree of malicious intent on the part of one of the spouses
makes it less difficult for the court to rationalize its decree in the face
of restrictive statutory provisions.4 To be sure, that degree of malice
necessary to constitute cruelty falls short of malice requirements in
other phases of the law; 4' yet, in the absence of any showing of malice
whatsoever, some courts will deny a divorce solely for that reason.42
"McNeill v. McNeill, Iz 5 Miss. 277, 87 So. 645 (1921).
"Walstrom v. Walstrom, 124 Fla. 366, 168 So. 532 (936).
"Aitcheson v. Aitcheson, 99 Iowa 93, 68 N.W. 373 (1896).
"Shaw v. Shaw, x7 Conn. 189 (1845)5 see also Latham v. Latham, 3o Gratt. 307
(Va. 1878). Contra: Fleming v. Fleming, 95 Cal. 430, 30 Pac. 566 (1892).
"
0 Rudnick v. Rudnick, 288 Mass. 256, 192 N.E. 5o (I934). ("It is settled law in
this Commonwealth that cruelty ... for divorce may exist without blows and is proved
if the acts charged create danger to the person or health. It may consist of angry,
coarse and abusive language ... or unreasonable exercise of marital rights of sexual in-
tercourse .... To establish cruel and abusive treatment . . . it being sufficient to prove
that such [injury to health] was the natural consequence of his conduct and that harm
... was reasonably likely to follow .... 1)5 Lyster v. Lyster, iii Mass. 327 (1873).
"Thomas v. Thomas, 247 Mich. 487, 226 N.W. 230 (1929).
" Tschida v. Tschida, 107 Minn. 235, 212 N.W. 193 (927).
3Bastien v. Bastien, x89 Atl. 37 (Sup. Ct. R.I. 1937).
40 Dahnke v. Dahnke, 55 Cal. App. 12, 2o2 Pac. 894 (i9z) 5 Lowry v. Lowry,
17o Ga. 349, 153 S.E. 11 (1930) ; Heinemann v. Heinemann, xiS Ore. 178, 245 Pac.
io82 (1926).
' Rebstock v. Rebstock, 144 N.Y. Supp. 289 (913) (wherein the court attempted
to define the malice element in cruelty: "Cruelty involves the idea of wantonness, that
an act is done willfully and for the purpose of inflicting suffering.").
'"Armstrong v. Armstrong, 229 Mass. 592, 118 N.E. 9x6 (xg8); Philley v.
Philley, 207 Mich. 672, 175 N.W. 158 (1919) (where acts complained of resulted from
the disposition of the spouse and were not controllable, therefore not intentionally mo-
tivated); Heim v. Heim, 35 Ohio App. 408, 172 N.E. 451 (1930) (where offending
spouse was not completely sane the court held that a lunatic cannot be held accountable
if he does not understand the nature of his acts) ; Grey v. Grey, 113 Pa. Super. 215,
172 Atl. 41z (1934) (where the wife's cruel acts resulted from illness brought on by
1954]
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In an early Connecticut case,43 for example, the court denied a divorce
where complainant proved serious impairment to her health because
of cruel treatment by her husband, but failed to establish, prima facie,
the presence of malice or knowledge on the part of defendant that in-
jury would result. It was nearly a century before the courts of Con-
necticut could avoid the import of the earlier precedent and recognize
that cruel treatment necessarily includes at least implied malice.44
Necessity for Persistency of Conduct.
A troublesome question for the courts has been whether repeated
acts of cruelty are necessary in order to meet statutory requirements.
In at least three states, statutes explicitly require continual abuse in order
that cruelty sufficient to justify divorce be established. 45  This view ap-
pears to be in accord with the weight of authority, even absent express
statutory provision.46 Generally, unless the cruel treatment is in itself
outrageous, 47 or will result in serious and permanent injury to com-
plainant, 48 or will, in the determination of the court, continue unless
judicially abated,49 single acts of cruelty will not entitle one to a divorce
decree.
husband's conduct). But see: Grierson v. Grierson, 156 Cal. 434, 1o5 Pac. i2o
(i9o9) i Rudnick v. Rudnick, 288 Mass. z56, xgz N.E. 501 (x934) (Divorce granted
because of husband's uncontrollable lust); McNeil v. McNeil, 125 Miss. 277, 87 So.
645 (1g2x); Robinson v. Robinson, 66 N.H. 6oo, 23 AtI. 362 (3893) (Where hus-
band's health was impaired by wife who insisted upon curing him as a Christian Science
healer).
"
3 Shaw v. Shaw, 17 Conn. 189 (845).
4 Morris v. Morris, 13Z Conn. i88, 43 A.zd 463 (945) ; Babcock v. Babcock,
117 Conn. 330, 167 Atl. 8S5 (-933).
" Kentucky--"habitual behavior" for not less than six months unless it is apparent
that by compelling the husband and wife to remain together there will be a serious
threat that permanent injury will result; Illinois-"extreme and repeated cruelty" con-
strued to preclude single acts of cruelty in Godfrey v. Godfrey, 284 Ill. App. 297, 1
N.E.zd 777 (936) and even a repetition when there has been a lapse of eight years
between the abuses in Shorediche v. Shorediche, 115 Ill. 102, 3 N.E. 736 (3885);
Mississippi-"habitual cruel and inhuman treatment" as a general course of conduct
rather than a single act in Manning v. Manning, i6o Miss. 38, 133 So. 673 (3933).
See Appendix infra.
42 27 C.J.S., Divorce § 25 (b), at 548.
"Gilbert v. Gilbert, 305 Ill. zx6, 137 N.E. 99 (1922) (calling wife a "whore"
when she was ill) ; Linnell v. Linnell, 143 N.E. 813 (Mass. 1924) (where husband shot
off a pistol in order to frighten wife).
"'Rice v. Rice, 88 W. Va. 54, xo6 S.E. 237 (3921) (such abuse by husband thai
wife was forced to run out of the house on a cold winter night).
"'Trigo v. Trigo, 90 Fla. 60, 105 So. 123 (i9,s) ; Curtiss v. Curtiss, 243 Mass.
5I, 136 N.E. 829 (1922) (a showing of a reasonable apprehension that the acts were
likely to continue and result in serious harm to complainant); Bamberg v. Bamberg,
323 N.J. Eq. 570, i99 Ad. 54. (1938); Frantz v. Frantz, 134 Pa. Super. 481, 3 A.zd
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Distinction Between Husband and Wife as Complainants.
Ordinarily, the courts maintain that when they grant or withhold
divorce decrees on the grounds of mental cruelty they do so without
regard to the sex of the complainant. However, the statutes of sev-
eral states demonstrate a more lenient attitude when the wife is the
complaining spouse than when the husband seeks the divorce. The
Alabama statute, 0 for example, makes the cruelty ground available
solely to the wife, and only for a divorce a mensa; the Tennessee stat-
ute 1 provides for a divorce, a mensa, to the wife where the husband
has rendered intolerable indignities; the Iowa Code5 2 allows divorce
on grounds of cruelty where there exists such "inhuman treatment as
to endanger te life of the wife" (emphasis added). Although the
statutes of Alabama, Tennessee, and Iowa are unique, the attitude fre-
quently lurks in judicial opinions that there is, and should be, a dis-
tinction drawn between husband and wife complainants with regard to
the degree of cruelty needed to satisfy the divorce requirements. 3 Few
courts are so bold in airing their inclinations toward favoring the female
complainant as was the Utah court in Cordner v. Cordner;54 but, whether
or not the courts admit that they make such a distinction, they appear
frequently to favor the woman at least with respect to the degree of
proof required.55 For example, in a Louisiana case,5" where the husband
987 (1939). But see: Frites v. Frites, 138 Ill. 436, 28 N.E. io58 (i891)3 Ramsey
v. Ramsey, x6z Ky. 741, 172 S.W. 1o82 (1915) 5 Culp v. Culp, 164 S.W.zd 623 (Mo.
App. 1942) 3 Johnston v. Johnston, z6o S.W. 770 (Mo. App. 1924) (single threat
to throw wife out the window when there was no attempt is insufficient. There must
not only be an apprehension, but it must be reasonable.); Bounds v. Bounds, 135 Md.
22o, 1o8 Atl. 870 (igxi); Philley v. Philley, 207 Mich. 672, 175 N.W. 15s (1919).
10 See Appendix infra. Ibid.
52 Iblid.
" Sales v. Sales, 222 Ky. 175, 300 S.W. 354 (1927) wherein the court said: "Her
cruelty was sufficient to justify him in leaving her, but cruelty by the wife is not a
ground of divorce to the husband."
51 91 Utah 466, 47o , 61 P.2d 6oi, 603 (1936). Here the court stated: "Some
nagging and fault-finding by each spouse is to be expected, and the husband cheing the
stronger, ought to forbear much of it with patience.... What may be cruelty causing
great mental distress in one case may not be in another. Each case must depend upon
its own facts and circumstances. The adjudged cases show that courts, on the ground
of cruelty, grant the wife a decree on much less evidence than they do the husband.
That rests on sound principles, for acts and conduct on the part of a husband may well
constitute cruelty to the wife causing her great distress, when similar acts and conduct
on her part may not constitute cruelty to him, or cause him great mental distress.
Before a decree is granted the husband on such grounds [mental cruelty], it ought to
be a somewhat aggravated case.' Doe v. Doe, 48 Utah 200, 158 Pac. 781. ['tg6]."
"See Levy v. Levy, 388 Ill. 179 , 57 N.E.zd 366 (x944) indicating the greater
degree of sympathy with which the courts view the physically weaker woman.
"Kammer v. Reed, 176 La. 1091, 147 So. 357 (1933).
1954]
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called complainant such names as "mutt-face," "goofy," and "slut," it
was held that such language was humiliating, inhuman, and sufficient to
justify a divorce decree; whereas in Pennsylvania, 7 which has a statute
similar to that of Louisiana, the court maintained that where the wife
publicly accused complainant husband of immoral conduct and con-
stantly and vulgarly expressed her contempt for him, her behavior was
too petty and trifling to upset a man. The courts seem to apply an
objective test with respect to a male complainant and a subjective test
with respect to a female complainant. For the man, the test might be
stated thus: "would a reasonable man be so distressed by such con-
duct on the part of his wife?"; for the woman, it becomes, "should
this woman, with all of her sensitivities and emotioflal instability,
be forced to live with her husband in view of his treatment of her?"
To be sure, there may be some justification for holding that men are
less affected by some charges and accusations than are women; yet, when
the courts are consistently influenced by the sex of the complainant but
fail to express it in their opinions, it does little to clarify the already con-
fused divorce law.
Station in Life or Refinement of the Parties.
It is well recognized that courts, in hearing allegations of mental
cruelty, are influenced by the intelligence, refinement, and delicacy of
the complaining party."" A crude person will not be upset by manifesta-
tions of unrefined habits, nor will an insensitive person be hurt by
ordinary insult." Thus, a complainant who himself appears to be rude
will not receive much sympathy from the court if he complains of rude-
ness on the part of his spouse,6" and the court will consider all char-
acteristics of the parties in reaching its result. 1 As the Pennsylvania
"Rose v. Rose, i24 Pa. Super. 437, 188 Atl. 595 (1936). See contra: Crabtree v.
Crabtree, 154 Ark. 40I, 242 S.W. 804 (9zz) Teal v. Teal, 324 Ill. 207, 155 N.E.
28 (19z6).
5 Stewart v. Stewart, 175 Ind. 41?, 94 N.E. 564 (i911); Valverde v. Valverde,
55 Nev. 82, 91, 26 P.2d 233, 237 (1933) wherein the court said: "Cruelty is a rela-
tive term. Its existance depends upon the character and refinement of the parties, and
its determination must depend upon its own particular facts. What might be cruelty
to one of refinement and of a sensitive nature would not be cruelty to one of a brutal
disposition."
"Fleming v. Fleming, 95 Cal. 430, 30 Pac. 566 (1892); Marks v. Marks, 56
Minn. 264, 57 N.W. 651 (1894) 5 Kelly v. Kelly, 18 Nev. 49, 1 Pac. 194 (1883).
"0Zweig v. Zweig, 46 Ind. App. 594, 93 N.E. 234 (9io); Cunningham v. Cun-
ningham, x87 Mich. 68, 153 N.W. 8 (1915); Emery v. Emery, x1x Mich. 146, 147
N.W. 452 (1914) ; Mosher v. Mosher, x6 N.D. 269, 1x3 N.W. 99 (1907) (profanity
and obscene language by the wife).
"1 Scheibe v. Scheibe, 134 P.2d 835 (Cal. App. 1943) ; Fleming v. Fleming, 95 Cal.
430, 30 Pac. 566 (i892); Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick, 123 Conn. z8, 193 Atl. 765
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court stated in Nye's Appeal6 2 '"We do not divorce savages or bar-
barians because they act as such towards each other."
SPECIFIC ACTS OR COURSES OF CONDUCT
Harsh or Humiliating Language.
The continued use of profane and abusive language has been held
to constitute sufficient mental cruelty upon which a divorce decree may
be predicated.3 However, the evidence must be of such a nature as to
convince the court that to compel the litigants to remain together as
husband and wife would result in a most undesirable marital status.64
For example, while occasional fits of ill temper and rudeness resulting
in abusive language are not sufficient grounds, 65 continued demonstra-
tions which indicate the futility of prolonging the existence of the union
have been held to warrant a divorce decree. 6
In those jurisdictions which require some resulting physical injury
to the complainant, harsh or humiliating language which does not bring
about such injury, or a reasonable apprehension thereof, is not, of
course, a sufficient cause for divorce.6 Thus, in Massachusetts,"" where
the court has continued to construe the divorce statute to require proof
of such cruelty as either will cause injury to the life or health of com-
plainant, or will create a danger or a reasonable apprehension of injury
if the parties are compelled to remain together, few divorces are granted
because of harsh or humiliating language.
Other courts, while ostensibly as stringent as the Massachusetts
court in adhering to the classical requirements,69 have allowed inroads
to be made into the conventional standards where it is shown that
language which is offensive, per se, has been used. In Mosher v.
0i937) Mosher v. Mosher, r6 N.D. 269, 113 N.W. 99 (1907) ; Reinhard v. Rein-
hard, 96 Wis. 555, 71 N.W. 803 (1897).
"
2 Nye's Appeal, 1z6 Pa. 341, 17 Ati. 61S (1889).
" Koehler v. Koehler, 137 Ark. 302, 209 S.W. 283 (1919) (husband continually
called wife "whore")5 Wirthman v. Wirthman, 225 Mo. App. 692, 39 S.W.2d 4o4.
(93 i Brookhouse v. Brookhouse, 286 Mich. 151, 281 N.W. 573 (1938).
0
,Brookhouse v. Brookhouse, 286 Mich. 151, 28 N.W. 573 (1938).
01 Watson v. Watson, 25 Tenn. App. 28, 149 S.W.2d 953 (1940).
Hockensmith v. Hockensmith, z86 Ky. 448, 151 S.W.zd 37 (1941).
07Andrews v. Andrews, 12o Cal. 184, 52 Pac. 298 (x898); Dabelstein v. Dabel-
stein, 191 Iowa 8o8, 183 N.W. 385 (i92i); Hamren v. Hamren, iSo Md. 69z, z6
A.2d 381 (1942) Krusinski v. Krusinski, 170 Mich. 561, 136 N.W. 593 (1912);
Erwin v. Erwin, 231 S.W. 834 (Tex. Civ. App. 192i).
08Brown v. Brown, 323 Mass. 332, 81 N.E.2d 820 (1948).




Mosher 70 where the defendant wife habitually used profane language
and related obscene stories to third persons in the presence of her much
embarrassed husband, the court granted a divorce when it was merely
shown that the husband's shy personality was affected by that conduct.
Nevertheless, in most states where there has been considerable divorce
litigation involving harsh and humiliating language, it has been held
that words alone are insufficient. Thus, in Illinois,7 1 Tennessee," Mary-
land,73 and Arkansas74 the courts have declined to grant a decree in the
absence of some resulting injury to complainant but have displayed a
willingness to accept even minute evidence of injury as a sufficient peg
upon which to hang their decree.75  Colorado, accepting what perhaps
is a more realistic view, has discarded the resulting injury requisites
and holds that words, in themselves, may constitute mental cruelty.70
But which view is better-that of Colorado, which manifests its true
rationale in the written opinion, or that of most of the other courts,
which dodges the real issues, is a matter that can be decided only with
a view toward the desired results. If the desired result is to exercise
strict control over divorce litigation, the view of the majority is more
efficacious. If, on the contrary, an intelligible standard or guide is the
objective, then the open expression of the Colorado court is the more
effective approach.
Denial of Conjagal Rights.
Usually, the refusal by one spouse to engage in sexual intercourse
is not, of itself, a ground for divorce. 77  The circumstances surrounding
"'Mosher v. Mosher, x6 N.D. 269, 113 N.W. 99 (1907). See also: Rader v. Rader,
136 Iowa 223, I13 N.W. 817 (1907); Carpenter v. Carpenter, 30 Kan. 712, 2 Pac.
122 (i883)i Outlaw v. Outlaw, 18 Md. 498, 84 Atl. 383 (1912); Humber v.
Humber, io9 Miss. 216, 68 So. i61 (1915); Morris v. Morris, io8 Misc. 228, 177
N.Y. Supp. 6oo (I919).
" Jackson v. Jackson, 294 Il. App. 552, 14 N.E.2d 271 (1938), Moore v. Moore,
262 Ill. 177, i99 N.E. 98 (1935).
72Watson v. Watson, 25 Tenn. App. 28, 149 S.W.2d 953 (1941).
"'Eberwein v. Eberwein, 65 A.zd 792 (Md. 1949); Smith v. Smith, 63 A.2d 628
(Md. 1949) ; Brett v. Brett, 1o9 Md. 704, 182 Atl. 305 (1936).
'+Kientz v. Kientz, 1o4 Ark. 381, 149 S.W. 86 (1912).
"Note, 5 ARK. L. REV. 419 (1951).
"Miller v. Miller, 90 Colo. 428, 9 P.zd 616 (1932).
"Underwood v. Underwood, 271 Fed. 553 (D.C. Cir. 1921) ; Pinnebad v. Pinne-
bad, 134 Ga. 496, 68 S.E. 73 (191o); Wagner v. Wagner, 203 Mich. 328, t68 N.W.
1019 (1918); Gilson v. Gilson, 113 N.J.Eq. 32, 166 Atl. xiI (1933); Taylor v.
Taylor, 142 Pa. Super. 441, 16 A.2d 65i (1940); Roush v. Roush, 90 W. Va. 491,
iii S.E. 334 (1922). See also Lohmuller v. Lohmuller, 135 S.W. 751, 753 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1911) wherein the court said: "[I]t has been uniformly held that a denial
of sexual intercourse of itself, even when persisted in for a long time, will not be a
ground for divorce, unless it injures the health."
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the denial may, however, present such an appealing case that the courts
will grant a divorce by maintaining that the refusal constitutes mental
cruelty.78 The courts apparently look closely at the reasons for the con-
duct of the offending spouse and at the duration of the refusal to co-
habit. If there seems to be a spiteful refusal7" on the part of one of the
spouses, as opposed to a refusal for sound reasons8" (e.g., health), s' a
divorce is likely to follow. For example, in Michigan, where a wife
declined to live with her husband for three years because she did not
like him and wanted to annoy him, a divorce was granted to the hus-
band on the ground that such treatment was extreme cruelty;8 2 and it
has been concluded that, where a wife, without cause, refused to cohabit
for i 2 years, there was sufficient cruelty to justify a divorce in the ab-
sence of any other statutory requirements.83 This view, while not
wholly in accord with the general case law 4 is nevertheless supported by
authorities in the field 5 and appears to be becoming more widely ac-
cepted by the courts.88
It is where the denial or marital rights is coupled with other factors,
none of which alone would justify a divorce in accordance with statu-
tory standards, that the courts are most apt to pigeon-hole the conduct
into the category of mental cruelty. 7 In a Michigan case,88 where a
wife called complainant vulgar names and refused to cohabit for several
years, a divorce was granted. The courts of Florida,89 Missouri,"0 and
'8 Another category wherein such conduct is often placed in order that a divorce
might be granted is that of desertion, either actual or constructive. See note 175 A.L.R.
708, 711 (1948).
70 Case v. Case, 159 Mich. 49x, Iz4 N.W. 565 (191o) Campbell v. Campbell,
149 Mich. 147, 11z N.W. 48o (1907); Tupper v. Tupper, 147 Ad. 633 (N.J.Eq.
1929) c f. Severns v. Severns, 107 Ill. App. 145. (1903) 5 Platt v. Platt, 38 Pa. Super.
551 (1908).
80Bishop v. Bishop, 133 Wash. 527, 233 Pac. 918 (1925).
81 Rausch v. Rausch, 146 Pa. Super. 342, 2z A.zd 221 (1941). See also: Ritter v.
Ritter, 103 Cal. App. 583, 587, 284 Pac. 950, 95z (1930) wherein the court said: "A
refusual of intercourse can be regard as cruelty only when without just or proper cause,
and when the health and bodily condition of both spouses would justify such inter-
course."
82 Case v. Case, 159 Mich. 491, 124 N.W. 565 (910).
8 3 Nordlund v. Nordlund, 97 Wash. 475, 166 Pac. 795 (1917).
"' KINGSLEY, DIVORCE IN MINNESOTA, 16 MINN. L. REV. 264 (193).
8 Ibid.
8 See note, 175 A.L.R. 708 (1948).
"' Currie v. Currie, izo Fla. z8, 162 So. 152 (1935).
88Waldhorn v. Waldhorn, 165 Mich. 130, 13o N.W. 199 (i91x). See also
Menzer v. Menzer, 83 Mich. 319, 47 N.W. 219 (i89o) for earlier indications of such
attitudes.
" Supra note 87.
80 Casey v. Casey, iSo Mo. App. 605, 163 S.W. 569 (1914).
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West Virginia9' likewise have considered denials of sexual intercourse,
along with other acts, as constituting mental cruelty upon which a di-
vorce decree might be predicated.
The denial of another marital right which not infrequently appears
as the basis of a divorce action is that of procreation. Generally it is
held that the mere refusal to have children, over the objections of the
other spouse, does not constitute cruelty, 2 nor does the refusal of one
spouse to engage in sexual intercourse unless contraception is practiced
authorize the granting of a divorce. 3
False charges of marital misconduct.
Although there is some early authority to the effect that false charges
of marital misconduct are not, in themselves, sufficient proof of cruelty
to sustain a divorce decree, 4 the great weight of authority today sup-
ports a contrary view." It must be shown that the accusations were
made in bad faith96 and without probable cause,97 although it has been
held that the absence of probable cause raises a presumption of bad
91 Cottle v. Cottle, 40 S. E. 2d 863 (W. Va. 1946); Croll v. Croll, io6 W. Va.
691, 146 S.E. 88o (1929); Perine v. Perine, 92 W. Va. 530, 114 S.E. 871 (1922).
"'-Avoidance of procreation has been held to constitute desertion or fraud based upon
an implied promise. See Note, 4 A.L.R.zd 227 (1949).
"
1Thomas v. Thomas, 219 Ala. 196, 121 So. 710 (1929); Lohmuller v. Lohmuller,
135 S.W. 751 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911).
"'Farnham v. Farnham, 73 Ill. 497 (1874); Holyoke v. Holyoke, 78 Me. 4o4, 6
Ad. 827 (i886)i Owens v. Owens, 96 Va. 191, 31 S.E. 72 (1898).
9 Folmar v. Folmar, 69 Ala. 84 (188x) ; Anderson v. Anderson, 68 Cal. App. 2s8,
228 Pac. 715 (1924); Babcock v. Babcock, 117 Conn. 310, 167 Ati. 85 (933);
Whetherington v. Whetherington, 57 Fla. 551, 49 So. 549 (19o9); Miller v. Miller,
139 Ga. 282, 77 S.E. 21 (1913); Eward v. Eward, 72 Ind. App. 638, 125 N.E. 468
(i919) 5 Blazek v. Blazek, 216 Iowa 775, 249 N.W. 199 (933); Bracken v. Bracken,
115 Kan. 494, 223 Pac. 288 (1924) Sandlin v. Sandlin, 289 Ky. 290, 158 S.W.2d 635
(1942); Vicknari v. Terracina, 164 La. 117, 113 So. 787 (1927); Poole v. Poole,
176 Md. 696, 6 A.2d 243 (939); Brookhouse v. Brookhouse, 286 Mich. 151, 281
N.W. 573 (938); Hertz v. Hertz, 126 Minn. 65, 147 N.W. 825 (1914), Holm v.
Holm, 251 S.W. 130 (Mo. App. 1923); Gordon v. Gordon, 77 N.H. 597, 92 Atl.
546 (1914); Feybusch v. Feybusch, 11o N.J.Eq. 358, 16o Atl. 386 (1932); Pearson
v. Pearson, io4 Misc. 675, 173 N.Y. Supp. 563 (1918); Reed v. Reed, i82 Okla, 149,
77 P.2d 30 (1938) ; Dietz v. Dietz, 158 Ore. 13, 72 P.zd 6o (1937); Beard v. Beard,
158 Tenn. 437, 14 S.W.2d 745 (1929)5 Boydston v. Boydston, 290 S.W. 927 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1927); Doe v. Doe, 48 Utah 200, 158 Pac. 781 (1916); Morris v. Morris,
57 Wash. 465, 107 Pac. 186 (1910).
" Rowe v. Rowe, 84 Kan. 696, 115 Pac. 553 (x911)_Elswick v. Elswick, 130
Okla. 42, 265 Pac. i2i (1928).9 7 Barnett v. Barnett, 292 Ky. 840, 168 S.W. 2d 17 (1943) ; Poole v. Poole, 176
Md. 69, 66 A.2d 243 (1939); Gindorff v. Gindorff, 295 Mich. 469, 295 N.W. 229
(1940)i Parman v. Parman, 94 Ore. 307, 185 Pac. 922 (1919). See also Barton
v. Barton, 97 N.J.Eq. 404, 128 Atl. 798 (925).
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faith."" In addition to these requirements some states adhere to the
classical requisites of danger to the health of the complainant 9 or
danger to life, 00 while other states allow evidence of mental anguish
to suffice.1 1 In Williams v. Williams' °2 for example, where com-
plainant's wife circulated letters accusing complainant of illicit relations
with church women, as a result of which complainant was requested to
leave the church, the court granted a divorce without any showing of
other injury resulting from the false charges.
Charges of unchastity may constitute cruelty whether privately0 3 or
publicly'0 4 made. If the accusations are communicated to third persons,
it is not necessary that they be believed, o for it is the effect that the
charges have upon the complainant and not the reactions of others that
is the test.10 Further, there need not be continued or repeated accusa-
tions, as a single charge of adultery can have a sufficiently damaging
effect.107 A single act of adultery, once condoned, will not license accusa-
tions predicated upon that act.'08 The fact that the accusations were
made while the defendant was intoxicated' 0 9 or was in a fit of rage or
insanity"0 does not negative the legal effect of the charges.
Accusations of marital misconduct which appear in the pleadings of
a divorce action may constitute cruelty which, in itself, might justify a
divorce decree."' If, however, it appears that the defendant had reason-
able grounds for the accusations or that they were made in good faith,
"
0Bracken v. Bracken, i15 Kan. 494, 223 Pac. z88 (1924); Wiggins v. Wiggins,
268 Ky. 352, 104 S.W.zd 1097 6937).
"' Sylvis v. Sylvis, II Co1. 319, 17 Pac. 912 (1888); Miller v. Miller, 139 Ga.
282, 77 S.E. 21 (i913) 5 Stover v. Stover, 94 N.J.Eq. 703, i2o Atl. 788 (1923).
'00 Harkins v. Harkins, 99 N.W. 154 (Iowa 19o4).
..1 O'Brien v. O'Brien, ioi Conn. 8o, 124 Atl. 816 (1924).
12 37 Ark. 176 (1870).
... Brandt v. Brandt, 178 Cal. 548, 174 Pac. 55 (1918) Ward v. Ward, 103 11L
477 (1882)5 Waltermire v. Waltermire, i o N.Y. 183, 17 N.E. 739 (1888); Boyd-
ston v. Boydston, 290 S.W. 927 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927). Contra: Harkins v. Harkins,
124 Iowa 69, 99 N.W. 154. (904).
1o See Note, 143 A.L.R. 623 6943).
... Shaw v. Shaw, 122 Cal. App. 172, 9 P.zd 876 (-932).
'
00 d. at 878.
"'
7Anderson v. Anderson, 68 Cal. App. 218, 228 Pac. 715 (.924).
'0"Williams v. Williams, i99 Ky. 259, 250 S.W. 982 (1923).
100 Harl v. Harl, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 2163, 73 S.W. 7;6 (1903) Pfannebecker v.
Pfannebecker, 133 Iowa 425, 11o N.W. 618 (907); Miller v. Miller, 89 Neb. 239,
131 N.W. 203 (1911); Elswick v. Elswick, 130 Okla. 42, 265 Pac. 121 (1928).
110 Champagne v. Duplottis, 147 La. 110, 84 So. 513 (192o).
. Wilson v. Wilson, 97 Ark. 643, 134 S.W. 963 (1911)5 Bush v. Bush, 245 Ky.
172, 53 S.W.2d 352 (1932) Clough v. Clough, 132 Neb. 748, 273 N.W. 31 (1937) ;
La Follett v. La Follett, 138 Ore. 4II, 6 P.2d io85 (1932) Owen v. Owen, 178
Wis. 609, 19o N.W. 363 (1922).
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there is no cruelty."' Thus, where the husband's complaint charged
lewd and lascivious conduct on his wife's part, the court found no cruelty
when it was shown that the charges were not made in bad faith."
Where both parties falsely and in bad faith accuse each other of infi-
delity, neither party may be granted a divorce on the ground of cru-
elty by reason of those accusations. 11 4
The courts usually treat the complainant wife with greater sym-
pathy than the husband, with regard to accusations of marital mis-
conduct. 1 The courts take notice of a double standard regarding sex
activity and conclude that men are much less sensitive than are women
concerning their reputations for chastity and faithfulness." 0
Miscellaneous conduct.
The following specific acts have been held to constitute mental cru-
elty justifying the granting of a divorce decree. While no less im-
portant than the types of conduct set forth above, they are not so com-
plex as to require more than brief attention.
Communications by one spouse of venereal disease has been held to
constitute mental cruelty"17 warranting divorce."" The complainant
must establish that the diseased spouse was aware of his condition'" and
that he made demands 20 for sexual intercourse with knowledge121 that
the disease was infectious. 2
2
.. Steele v. Steele, 237 Mich. 639, 213 N.W. 66 (1927)
"' Pennington v. Pennington, 294 Ky. 84, 171 S.W.zd io (x943).
... Biebisheimer v. Biebisheimer, 202 Iowa 668, 21o N.W. 896 (1926).
.15 See Note, 14.3 A.L.R. 623, 655 (94).
"'0Miller v. Miller, 89 Neb. 239, 131 N.W. 203 (191x) 5 Elswick v. Elswick, 130
Okla. 42, 265 Pac. 121 (1928) ; Doe v. Doe, 48 Utah 2oo, 158 Pac. 781 (1g96);
Roush v. Roush, 9o W. Va. 491, 111 S.E. 334 (1922).
"" Communication of venereal disease has also been subsumed under physical cruelty.
""Carbajal v. Fernandez, 13o La. 812, 58 So. 58x (1912); Holthoeffer v.
Holthoeffer, 47 Mich. 26o, ii N.W. i5o (x882); Darling v. Darling, 181 Mo. App.
211, 167 S.W. 1i66 (1914) ; Wagner v. Wagner, 8o Ore. 256, 156 Pac. 1037 (1916).
"" Anonymous, 17 Abb. N.C. 231 (N.Y. 1886).
.. Kline v. Kline, 179 Md. io, 16 A.zd 924 (1940), Lazarwitz v. Lazarwitz, 1o2
N.J.Eq. 132, 139 Adt. 88i (1928) (attempt to force wife to have sexual intercourse
while knowing of diseased condition); Abramowitz v. Abramowitz, 14o N.Y. Supp.
275 (913); McMahen v. McMahen, x86 Pa. 485, 40 Atl. 795 (1898). But mere
requests do not constitute cruelty. Bowman v. Bowman, 6 W.W. Harr. 84, 171 Ad.
444 (Del., 1934).
"'Knowledge is not necessarily actual knowledge but facts from which a reason-
able man would conclude the presence of venereal disease. Carbajal v. Fernandez, 130
La. 812, 58 So. 581 (1912).
.. Hanna v. Hanna, 3 Tex. Civ. App. 5x, 21 S.W. 720 (1893) wherein the court
held that the question of scienter was a matter of fact and not a question of law.
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Association with objectionable persons 123 or compelling one's spouse
to associate with undesirable or lewd persons'24 has been held to consti-
tute mental cruelty. This type of cruelty is frequently the subject of
litigation where one of the spouses invites undesirable persons to be
house guests for long periods. 28
Although a husband is not generally chargeable with the misconduct
of third persons, it has been held that he owes to his wife the duty
of protecting her from the abuse of others, and a divorce may be granted
upon a showing of his failure to do so.' 26
An unjustified refusal by one spouse to speak to the other spouse
accompanied by an otherwise disagreeable attitude 2 will entitle the
complainant to a divorce. 28
An unfounded charge of insanity'29 or a malicious attempt to have
one's spouse committed to an asylum 30 may constitute cruelty. The
test is whether the charge or attempt was made in good faith with the
welfare of the complainant in mind.' 3 '
As a general proposition religious differences do not constitute cru-
elty unless one of the spouses is so fanatical as to render family happi-
ness impossible. 132 In cases where actual injury to one spouse results
from the religious fanaticism of the other a divorce will be granted. 33
The "cruelty" may be confined to the relation between the spouses.
It may further be marked by affirmative physical and mental factors, as
in the case of an unnatural sex act; l ' affirmative mental factors with a
possibility of physical repercussions, as where defendant is in a state of
habitual intoxication;' 3 5 or exclusively affirmative mental aspects, as in
"'3Frith v. Frith, 189 Iowa 2oi, 175 N.W. 761 (1920).
' Hooker v. Hooker, 65 Fla. 53, 6z So. i21 (9X3) Craig v. Craig, 129 Iowa
197, 105 N.W. 446 (1905) i Goff v. Goff, 6o W.Va. 9, 53 S.E. 769 (19o6).
"'Craig v. Craig, i29 Iowa gz, 105 N.W. 446 (1905).
1-5 Snyder v. Snyder, 98 Misc. 431, 16z N.Y. Supp. 607 (1917) Sayles v. Sayles,
41 R.I. 170, 103 Ad. 225 (1918).
"'Hiecke v. Hiecke, 163 Wis. 171, 157 N.W. 747 (igi6).
128 Ibid.
'-'Michels v. Michels, 1zo Me. 395, 115 Atd. 161 (x9zi).
'"
5 Andrews v. Andrews, 1zo Cal. 184, 52 Pac. 298 (1898).
... Schutte v. Schutte, 90 W. Va. 787, 111 S.E. 840 (19Z2).
" Krauss v. Krauss, 163 La. zxS, 111 So. 683 (927).
... Robinson v. Robinson, 66 N.H. 6oo, 23 Ad. 362 (i891) where husband suffered
illness because wife who was a Christian Scientist denied him medical attention.
"'Doolin v. Doolin, z1 Ky. 207, 277 S.W. 243 (y9z5) (father having inter-
course with daughter resulting in daughter becoming pregnant)s Crutcher v. Crutcher?
86 Miss. 231, 38 So. 337 (i9o5) (sodomy). But see Wood v. Wood, 141 Mass.
495, 6 N.E. 541 (x886) wherein wife was denied a divorce because husband engaged
in masturbation, but she was not forced to be present during the acts.
... Bennett v. Bennett, 55 Cal. App. 268, 203 Pac. 16z (19at) 3 Balfe v. Balfe, 165
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the case of continuous nagging. 36  But "cruelty" need not be confined
to, or perhaps even immediately identified with, the spouse-to-spouse
relation. Affirmative factors are present where spouse A abuses the
children thus causing distress to spouse B.137  Negative factors-failure
to do one's duty'3 -- are involved where spouse A permits his relatives
to abuse spouse B.'3 9 A may be held to a duty to prevent the abuse and
to protect and to defend B under such circumstances. 4
After reading this list of possible mental cruelties one may wonder
whether a husband and wife can live together for any length of time
without supplying each other with grounds for divorce. It may appear
that marriage takes on some of the aspects of a status by sufferance, and
the question arises whether the courts should not require the plaintiff,
in addition to proving mental cruelty, to satisfy the court that he has
done everything within reason to make a successful marriage.' 4'
La. 283, 115 So. 489 (Y928); Hall v. Hall, 172 Mich. 2io, 137 N.W. 536 (1912);
Maxwell v. Maxwell, 69 W. Va. 414, 71 S.E. 571 (1g1). Contra: Sedgwick v.
Sedgwick, 5o Colo. 164, 114 Pac. 488 (igzx); Cruikshank v. Cruikshank, zn5
NJ.Eq. 322, 17o Adl. 659 (1934).
"
6 Barngrover v. Barngrover, 57 Cal. App. 43, 2o6 Pac. 461 (1922) (continuous
nagging for ten years); Putnam v. Putnam, 86 Mont. 135, 282 Pac. 855 (1929).
But cf. Bird v. Bird, 171 Wis. 219, 177 N.W. 4 (1920).
"3Poe v. Poe, 149 Ark. 62, 231 S.W. 198 (1921) (mistreatment of stepchild with
intent to upset parent) ; Williamson v. Williamson, 183 Ky. 435, 209 S.W. 503 (1919)
(attempt by husband to get rid of child by wife's former marriage); Romero v.
Dautrielle, 163 La. 597, 112 So. 498 (1927); Miller v. Miller, 54 Nev. 44, x P.2d
1o88 (932). But the use of reasonable force in order to discipline his children is not
cruelty to one's spouse. Kruschke v. Kruschke, 1o3 Ore. 6ox, 205 Pae. 973 (1922)1
Loring v. Loring, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 95, 42 S.W. 642 (x897).
... Inman v. Inman, 296 Iowa 845, 195 N.W. 583 (1923); Mecke v. Mecke, x%6
Kan. 760, 271 Pac. 275 (gz8); Metcalf v. Metcalf, x66 Ore. 644, 114 P.2d 547
(1941) (failure to provide medical care).
..9 Day v. Day, 84 Iowa 221, 50 N.W. 979 (1892); Thompson v. Thompson, zo5
Mich. I24, 171 N.W. 347 (gi9); Dakin v. Dakin, i Neb. 457, 95 N.W. 781
(i9o) 5 Fraser v. Fraser, 87 N.J.Eq. 633, 1o Atl. 58 (x9x7); Nickerson v. Nickerson,
34 Ore. i, 54 Pac. 277 (1898); Schuster v. Schuster, 88 Utah 257, 53 P.d 428
(1936)5 Hutchins v. Hutchins, 93 Va. 68, 24 S.E. 903 (1896). Contra, Artigues v.
Artigues, 172 La. 884, 135 So. 665 (931).
1.0 See cases cited note 126 supra.
... Sayre, Divorce for the Unworthy: Specific Grounds for Divorce, 18 LAW & CON-
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DESCRIPrIVE WORDS
Cruelty attended by actual vio-
lence which endangers life or
health of reasonable apprehension
thereof.
Cruel and inhuman treatment
calculated to impair health or
endanger life . . . personal in-
dignities rendering life burden-
some or incompatibility of tem-
perament.
Conduct on part of husband
rendering cohabitation unsafe.
Cruel and barbarous treatment
as to endanger the life of the
other, or shall offer such indig-
nities to the person of the other
as shall render his or her con-
dition intolerable.
Extreme cruelty. Extreme cru-
elty is wrongful infliction of
grievous bodily injury or griev-
ous mental suffering.
Extreme and repeated cruelty...
such cruelty may consist of the
infliction of mental suffering....
Intolerable cruelty.
Extreme cruelty . . . such as to
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Extreme and repeated cruelty.
Cruel and inhuman treatment.
Inhuman treatment as to en-
danger the life of the wife.
Extreme cruelty.
Cruel beating or injury, or at-
tempt at injury as indicates out-
rageous temper, or probable
danger to life or great bodily in-
jury from remaining together.
Cruel treatment or outrages such
as to render living together in-
supportable.
Extreme cruelty.
Cruelty of treatment ...
Cruel and abusive treatment.
Extreme cruelty, whether by per-
sonal violence or other means.
Cruel and inhuman treatment.
Habitual cruel and inhuman
treatment.
Cruel or barbarous treatment as
to endanger life. Indignities.
Repeated publications or utter-
ances of false charges against
unchastity or the infliction of
grievous mental suffering for
one year, reasonably calculated
to destroy happiness, defeat the
purpose of marriage, or render
married relations intolerable.
Extreme cruelty, whether by per-























N.M. STAT. § 25-701
N.Y.C.P.A. § ix6,
(1948)





§ 3105.01 (Page, 1954)
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12,
§ 1271 (94)
ORE. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 9-907 (940)
PA. STAT. tit. 23, § 1o
(Purdon, 1930)
R.I. GEN. LAWS c. 416,
§ z (938)
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(195z)
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Cruel and inhuman treatment.
Cruel and inhuman treatment.
Cruel or barbarous treatment as
endangers the life of the other.




Cruel and inhuman treatment or
personal indignities rendering
life burdensome.
Cruel and barbarous treatment,
endangering the life of the in-
jured and innocent spouse. Such
indignities to the person of the
injured and innocent spouse as to
render his or her condition in-
tolerable or life burdensome.
Extreme cruelty.
Physical cruelty.
Extreme cruelty . . . infliction
of grievous bodily injury or
grievous mental suffering.
Cruel and inhuman treatment as
renders cohabitation unsafe and
improper, and in the case of the
wife, to be under the domination
and control of the husband. That
husband has offered such indig-
nities to the wife's person as to





























Excess, cruel treatment or out-
rages toward the other, if such
ill treatment is of such a nature
as to render their living together
insupportable.
Cruel treatment to the extent of




Cruel treatment or personal in-
dignities rendering life burden-
some.
Cruel and inhuman treatment, or
reasonable apprehension of bodily
harm, and a false charge of
prostitution ...
Treatment of the wife by the
husband has been cruel and in-
human, whether practiced by
using personal violence or by
other means, or where the wife
shall be guilty of like cruelty to
her husband or shall be given
to intoxication.
Extreme cruelty. . . . Indigni-
ties.
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